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Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the impacts of trade reforms on wages. We first
introduce a model of trade that combines a non-competitive wage setting mechanism
due to unions with a factor abundance hypothesis. The predictions of the model
are then econometrically investigated using Argentine data. Instead of achieving
identification by comparing industrial wages before and after one episode of trade
liberalization, our strategy exploits the recent historical record of policy changes
adopted by Argentina: from significant protection in the early 1970s, to the first episode
of liberalization during the late 1970s, then back to a slowdown of reforms during the
1980s, and finally to the second episode of liberalization in the 1990s. These swings
in trade policy represent broken trends in trade reforms that we can compare with
observed trends in wages and wage inequality. We use unusual historical data sets
of trends in tariffs, wages, and wage inequality to examine the structure of wages in
Argentina and to explore how it is affected by tariff reforms. We find that i) trade
liberalization, ceteris paribus, reduces wages; ii) industry tariffs reduce the industry
skill premium; iii) conditional on the structure of tariffs at the industry level, the
average tariff in the economy is positively associated with the aggregate skill premium.
These findings suggest that the observed trends in wage inequality in Latin America
can be reconciled with the Stolper-Samuelson predictions in a model with unions.
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1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to provide a comprehensive explanation of the links between trade
reforms and wages in developing countries. While there is certainly a very voluminous
literature on this topic, two novel features differentiate our paper: the theoretical framework
that we use to motivate and guide our analysis, and the data tailored for this project. These
differences, we believe, are two valuable contributions of our work.
Theoretically, the notion that trade affects wage inequality stems largely from the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. Countries specialize in
the production of those goods that use intensively the abundant factors of production. In its
simplest form, the theorem states that while developed countries specialize in the production
of skilled intensive goods, developing countries specialize instead in goods that use intensively
unskilled labor. One key implication of this model is that trade liberalization should lead to
an increase in the skilled wage premium in developed countries and a corresponding decline
in developing countries.
The Stolper-Samuelson prediction is at odds with most of the empirical literature on the
impacts of trade liberalization and wage inequality in Latin America, which in fact shows that
tariff liberalization has increased the disparity in labor earnings between skilled and unskilled
workers. Examples include Feliciano (2001), Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003), Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2004), Harrison and Hanson (1999), Revenga (1997), and Robertson (2004).1 The
leading argument advanced to account for the discrepancy between the model and the data
is the dependency of the impacts of trade liberalization on the initial structure of tariffs. If
protection is initially granted in those sectors that use unskilled labor more intensively, then
trade liberalization might cause relative unskilled wages to decline and wage inequality to
increase.2
In this scenario, we ask whether it is possible to preserve the Stolper-Samuelson
1For developed countries, the Stolper-Samuelson result is supported by Sachs and Shatz (1994) and
Leamer (1998) but it is disputed by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993).
2Other mechanisms behind the observed increase in wage inequality after trade liberalization are skilled
biased technical change induced by openness and skill complementarity of capital goods or imported
materials. See Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Feenstra and Hanson
(1999), and Pavcnik (2003).
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mechanism, and we claim that we can actually do that by expanding the basic factor
abundance model to incorporate elements from labor economics. The literal Heckscher-Ohlin
view of trade and wage inequality assumes the existence of competitive labor markets with
perfect intersectoral factor mobility. This implies that the wages of workers with the same
skills should equalize across sectors and that wages should change in the same way in all firms,
independently of their internal features and reflecting only overall external market conditions.
These predictions are, however, in sharp contrast with the evidence on wage differentials,
even for similar individuals, documented by Dickens and Katz (1986) and Krueger and
Summers (1988), and more recently by Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) within the
trade literature. Further, Gibbons and Katz (1989) and Krueger and Summers (1988) suggest
that these wage premiums cannot be fully explained by compensating differentials alone, thus
acknowledging the role of other explanatory factors such as sector-specific human capital,
unionization, profit sharing or bargaining between workers and firms. Moreover, there is
evidence to indicate that these wage premiums can in part be affected by trade. Dickens and
Lang (1988) and Gaston and Trefler (1994) find that the industry premiums are correlated
with trade flows in the U.S., and Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) and Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2005) establish a similar link with sectoral tariffs.
It follows that a useful new model of trade and wages should combine a factor abundance
hypothesis with inter-industry wage differentials. Our model thus works with an unskilled
labor abundant country that in consequence exports unskilled intensive goods and imports
skilled intensive goods. This feature of the model generates a Stolper-Samuelson type
prediction: conditional on the cross-section structure of protection, the economy-wide skill
premium moves in the same direction as the average tariff in the economy. However, wages
do not equalize across sectors. While this could also be the consequence of imperfect labor
mobility, here we emphasize the role of non-competitive wage setting mechanisms.3 In
particular, we assume that the wage setting for unskilled labor in the import competing sector
is non-competitive. A union bargains for a fraction of the tariff rent and then distributes it
among unskilled workers in the import sector, who thus enjoy a wage premium over similar
3Sector wages bargained by unions are quite prevalent in the case study for Argentina that we investigate
below (see Galiani and Nickell, 1999).
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workers in the export sector. Even with competitive labor markets for skilled workers, this
feature of the model generates differences in the skill premium at the industry level that, in
turn, depend negatively on the industry tariff. Thus, the model predicts that, conditional on
aggregate protection, sectoral skill premiums and sectoral tariffs move in opposite directions.
In the current literature on trade and wages, identification generally follows from few
cross-sections of industry tariffs and wages of skilled and unskilled workers. However,
with few cross-sections, the estimated coefficients may confound unobserved effects and
unaccounted simultaneous policy reforms. This is a major concern in Latin America during
the 1990s, a period when most countries implemented several concurrent reforms. Further,
when there are short-run departures from Heckscher-Ohlin, like in our model, it is not
possible to identify Stolper-Samuelson effects from only a few cross-sections because the
time dimension of the data becomes essential to separate the different forces in place. We
overcome these issues by setting up historical data sets of trends in trade reforms, trends in
wages, and trends in skill wage premiums in Argentina. Our data span the period 1974-2001.
We construct a time series of tariffs, for different sectors in different years, and a time series of
labor force surveys with data on individual wages. This is the first instance in this literature
in which such a historical record of trade reforms is combined with a comparable micro data
set of workers and wages.4 The outcome is almost 30 years of data on sectoral tariffs and
individual wages.
With these data, we can pursue a stronger identification strategy by exploring the recent
historical record of trade policy changes adopted by Argentina during the last 30 years: from
significant protection in the early 1970s, to the first trade liberalization episode in the late
1970s and early 1980s, then back to a slowdown of tariff cuts in the 1980s, and finally to
the second liberalization of the 1990s (which included Mercosur, a regional trade agreement
among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). These swings in trade policy generate
broken trends in tariff reforms that we can compare with observed trends in wages. This
encompasses a different, useful, and credible identification strategy. Further, we can exploit
4The work by Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004) and Golberg and Pavcnik (2005) is similar to
ours in that it exploits data from the eighties and the nineties. There is a major difference, though. Whereas
their study involves one trade reform, we study two episodes of trade liberalization separated by a reversal
to protection.
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both our cross-section variability in sectoral tariffs as well as our time-series variability in
the average national tariff to better uncover the presence of Stolper-Samuelson effects on the
structure of wages. We propose to extract Stolper-Samuelson effects using the time series of
the average national tariff once the effects of sectoral tariffs on the structure of wages are
controlled for. Our data, which combines a times series of cross-sections and tariffs, provide
us with a unique opportunity to establish this result.
Our findings are as follows. First, we find that, for a given aggregate level of tariff
protection (that is, keeping constant the average national tariffs) sectoral tariffs protect
sectoral workers (so that, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the tariff accrued to a particular
sector leads to a decrease in wages). Further, after controlling for individual worker
characteristics, period effects, industry effects, and time-varying skill premium effects, we
find a strong negative association between tariffs and the skill premium at the industry level.
This implies that sectoral tariffs benefits sectoral unskilled labor. Second, we are able to
trace Stolper-Samuelson effects in the structure of wages. After controlling for the structure
of tariffs at the industry level, the average tariff in the economy is positively associated with
the economy-wide skill premium over time. This implies that trade liberalization can actually
benefit the abundant factor which, in developing countries, is unskilled labor.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data
used in this paper and we motivate our work by describing the trends in trade liberalization
and the trends in wage inequality in Argentina. In Section 3, we lay out one theoretical
framework that is consistent with the basic trends found in the data. In Section 4, we
present our regression analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Tariff Reforms and the Structure of Wages
A major input into our analysis is the historical data on Argentine trade policy and wages,
spanning the 1974-2001 period. These data come from two different sources: customs data
on imports and tariffs at the sectoral level, and household survey data on wages and workers.
We begin by describing the customs data. We measure trade policies with sectoral tariffs.
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Data on ad-valorem import tariffs come from official Tariff Schedules, which specify the tariff
rate levied on each item of the Harmonized System (HS). In order to make our trade data
comparable with the wage data, we need to build tariff measures at the 3-digit level of
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). To do this, we first match each
heading in the HS with its closest equivalent in the ISIC classification. We then aggregate
the HS data to build measures of tariffs at the 3-digit level. To perform the aggregate, we
start from the next-to-lowest subheading, calculate the median of the item belonging to it,
and iterate on this procedure.5 We end up with a panel data set of import tariffs for the
manufacturing sector across time. Figure 1 provides some insights into the nature of trade
policy and trade reform in different years. It depicts key percentiles of the distribution of
import tariffs.
The recent historical Argentine trade policy is characterized by at least three different
periods. Our starting point in 1974 was one of high protection, with average tariffs in
excess of 100 percent, and sectors with median rates in excess of 200 percent. Starting in
1976, tariffs were abruptly reduced. The average tariff was cut by two thirds in three years,
dropping from slightly above 100 percent in 1976, to 47 percent in 1978 and to 32 percent
in 1979. In addition, the whole distribution shifted downwards with respect to 1974.
The trend in trade reforms is broken in 1982 when there was a slight increase in average
tariffs that continued all throughout the eighties. Notice, however, that trade policy is
not limited to tariffs but includes non-tariff barriers like quotas, or quantitative restrictions.
Although we were unable to construct adequate measures of non-tariff barriers for the period
under analysis, the historical accounts on the use of quantitative restrictions in Argentina
(Berlinski, 1994; Berlinski, 2003) reveal a heavy use of quotas until 1959, when they were
eliminated. Quotas were reinstated in 1982 and maintained all through the 1980s until they
were again fully eliminated in 1989-1990 as a pre-requisite to Mercosur negotiations. The
reversal of trade policy during this period is thus more evident in quotas than in tariffs.
In contrast, tariff rates were reduced in 1990 and 1991, remaining below 20 percent
5See the Data Appendix in the working paper version (www.sites....COMPLETAR) for further details
on sources of information, the matching of Harmonized System and ISIC classification, and the aggregation
procedure.
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Figure 1
Distribution of Median Tariffs per 3 digit sector
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Note: Distribution of tariffs at the 3-digit ISIC manufacturing sector for selected years.
The horizontal line within each box is the median tariff in each year. The borders of
the boxes are the 25th and 75th percentiles of the tariff distribution. The horizontal
bars outside the boxes are the “adjacent values.” The upper adjacent value is the largest
data value that is less than or equal to the sum of the 75th percentile and 1.5 times the
interquantile range. The lower adjacent line is the smallest data value that is greater than
or equal to the different between the 25th percentile and 1.5 times the interquantile rage.
The box plot does not show the “outside values,” values exceeding the upper and lower
adjacent values. Quantiles are calculated weighting each sector by its employment level.
throughout all the 1990s decade. In 1994, Mercosur was adopted and tariffs were further
reduced. However, in an attempt to prevent a fiscal crisis, there was a slight increase in
protection in 2001.
We turn now to the labor force data. The standard source of individual data on labor
earnings and worker characteristics in Argentina is the Permanent Household Survey (EPH,
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares). This is a household survey with information on wages,
employment status, and individual and family characteristics. The data are usually collected
twice a year, in May and October. The EPHs of the 1990s have been already used in the
literature but, for our purposes, we needed to track the surveys back into the 1970s and
1980s. We were able to compile 40 EPH surveys.6 We have data for all years, except for
6The Data Appendix in the working paper version (www.COMPLETAR) provides a brief description of
the different data sets used here and their sample sizes.
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1979, 1983, and 1984. For years 1974, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1985, 1986, and 1992, we only
have information for October (and thus not for May). In contrast, in 1980 and 1982, we use
data on May but not on October.
Before launching our formal econometric investigation, we provide next snapshots of
the main features of the data. To do that, we casually inspect our data to report prima
facie evidence on the relationship between the trends in tariff reforms and the trends in
the structure of wages in Argentina. We begin with the “tradable premium.” If firms in
the import competing sectors take the outside opportunity of workers as given but pay a
wage premium, which may be due to the protection granted by sectoral tariffs, we should
see in the data that firms in the tradable sector cannot pay less than the competitive wage
paid by firms in unprotected sectors. Figure 2 reveals evidence in favor of the “tradable
premium” in our data. The figure depicts the coefficient of a tradable dummy, for different
years from 1974 to 2001, in a standard earnings equation (after controlling, in each year, for
age, age squared, gender, marital status and a set of education dummy variables). With a
few exceptions, the estimated tradable premiums are always positive in our data.
Further, Figure 2 reveals that the tradable premium is likely to depend inversely on the
level of aggregate protection. In fact, the average tradable sector wage premium is decreasing
during the 1970s (the first episode of trade liberalization in Argentina), increasing during
the 1980s (the reversal episode of quota use and stagnation of tariff cuts), and decreasing
again during the 1990s. This is the first trend uncovered by our data.
The second major trend of interest involves the aggregate skill premium at the national
level. To document this, we restrict our sample to tradable manufacturing sectors only.
We compute the skilled wage premium by defining three educational categories: skilled
labor, which comprises workers who have finished college, semiskilled labor, which consists
of workers who have finished secondary school (and may have incomplete college education),
and unskilled labor, which includes workers with no schooling, complete and incomplete
primary education, and incomplete secondary education. The skill premium is calculated as
the coefficient on the skilled dummy in a standard earnings regression. Concretely, we ran
separate regressions of wages on the skill dummy for one survey in each year, controlling for
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Figure 2
The Tradable Premium
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Note: own calculations based on historical trade data and labor surveys (EPH). The
graph shows estimates of the “trade” premium. For each year in the sample, an earnings
regression of log wages on age, age squared, gender, marital status, educational dummies
and a tradable sector dummy is estimated. The coefficient of the tradable dummy is defined
as the “trade premium”; it accounts for the premium, over the non-tradable sector, paid
in sectors exposed to international trade.
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Figure 3
Trends in Tariffs and in Wage Premium
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Note: own calculations based on historical trade data and labor surveys (EPH). Tariff:
average tariff across all 3-digit ISIC sectors, weighted by employment in each sector. Skilled
wage premium: coefficients on the skilled dummy in different earnings regressions per year.
See text for more details.
age, age squared, gender and marital status. Notice that we do not include trade related
variables at this point.7
Figure 3 reveals the breaks in trade liberalization trends and the breaks in the wage
inequality trends. The broken line corresponds to the evolution of the average tariff during
the period 1974-2001. The figure clearly shows the initial high protection on the early 1970s,
the liberalization of the late 1970s, the stagnation of tariffs during the 1980s, and the last
episode of liberalization of the 1990s.
The solid line in Figure 3 depicts the skill premium.8 There is a sharp increase in the wage
differential between skilled and unskilled workers between 1974 and 1982, coinciding with the
7One concern is the relevance of college degrees in the 1970s when a lower fraction of the population
attained those degrees. To account for this, in the regression analysis of Section 4, we also work with an
alternative definition of skills that merges workers with both secondary and college education. Our main
findings are robust.
8Note that we report the estimated coefficient directly –i.e., without the standard exponential
transformation (ecoefficient − 1).
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first wave of trade policy reforms. While individuals with college education earned roughly
60 percent more than their unskilled counterparts in 1974, the difference grew to about 120
percent in 1982. Between 1982 and 1989, when trade liberalization lost momentum, the
skill premium decreased markedly. In contrast, the skill premium resumed its upward course
during the 1990s, coinciding with the second episode of trade liberalization. Thus, prima
facie, there is evidence of a correlation between the skilled premiums and the tariffs.
Our last observation relates to the skill premium at the industry level. In the Argentine
data, the inter-industry wage differentials of Dickens and Katz (1986), Krueger and Summers
(1988), and Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) vary with the skill level so that there are
skilled premiums at the industry level. For our purposes, the main features of these premiums
is that they correlate negatively with the sectoral tariffs. To see this, we estimate a sectoral
skill premium for each manufacturing industry after pooling the data for all years. This
regression includes a full set of industry dummies, skill dummies, individual characteristics,
and survey effects. The output of interest is a set of interactions between the skilled dummies
(for college education) and the industry dummies that measure the average skilled industry
premium in the sample. In Figure 4, we plot these premiums against the average tariff in
each sector in the sample. The graph gives a clear hint of a negative relationship between
the sectoral tariff and the skilled industry premium.
3 A Simple Theoretical Framework
Our aim in this section is to introduce a theoretical model to reconcile Stolper-Samuelson
effects with the existence of skilled premiums at the industry level and to account for
the correlations observed in Argentina (and in several Latin American countries) between
trade liberalization and wage inequality. Thus, we want to develop an analytical framework
that merges two key mechanisms: the economic logic of neoclassical models of trade (like
Heckscher-Ohlin) and the existence of (skilled) wage premiums at the industry level. Based
on the trends in Figure 3 and the pattern of tariffs and industry-skill premiums in Figure
4, we claim that a useful model of trade protection and wage inequality should embed both
11
Figure 4
The Skill Premium at the Industry Level and Sectoral Tariffs
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Note: own calculations based on historical trade data and labor surveys (EPH). Tariff:
average tariff for each 3-digit ISIC sector across years (1974-2001). Skilled-industry
premium is the coefficient of an interaction between the skilled dummy and the industry
dummies in the pooled EPHs across years.
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typical explanations of the pattern of trade and inter-industry wage differentials. We propose
to do this by combining a factor abundance hypothesis with a non-competitive wage setting
mechanism in import competing sectors. In particular, we allow wages in import sectors
to be determined by the bargaining power of unions. Although similar predictions can be
derived with models of imperfect factor mobility or profit sharing, a model with unions seems
more relevant for our empirical analysis on Argentina, where the presence of unions in the
manufacturing sector is widespread (Galiani and Nickell, 1999).
The role of unions in our model is to protect unskilled workers. There is strong evidence
that unions actually compress the wage distribution, particularly from below (Freeman,
1982). That is, unions raise the wages of workers who, on spot labor markets, would
earn relatively low wages. This is because unions raise wages above market clearing levels
whenever market clearing wages are close to the reservation wage (Vogel, 2007). Card et
al. (2003a) present evidence on union wage compression for the U.S., the U.K. and Canada;
Stephan and Gerlach (2005) present evidence for continental Europe (see, also, Card et al.
(2003b) and Blau and Kahn (1996)). Marshall (2001) presents evidence that documents the
wage compression induced by unions in Argentina.
For simplicity, we work with two tradable sectors, i = 1, 2. At this point, the best way
to think about these sectors is as aggregate exportable and importable sectors. (We indicate
how to expand the model to various importable sectors below). There is also a non-tradable
sector, denoted with 0. There are two factors of production with fixed supply, skilled S and
unskilled U labor. The country is small and takes international prices p∗i as given. The price
of the non-traded good is determined endogenously.
Sector 2 is skilled intensive:
(1)
a2s
a2u
>
a1s
a1u
,
where aiu and ais are the technological requirements of unskilled and skilled labor,
respectively, in sector i. Since the country is relatively abundant in unskilled labor, the
unskilled intensive good 1 is exported and the skilled intensive good 2 is imported. This is
the standard factor abundance, Heckscher-Ohlin prediction.
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Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors. The market for skilled labor is competitive in
all sectors with equilibrium wage ws. The market for unskilled labor in the non-tradable and
exportable sector 1 is also competitive, with equilibrium wage wu. The zero-profit condition
in sector 0 is
(2) p0 = wsa0s + wua0u,
where p0 is the price in domestic currency. The corresponding zero-profit condition in the
export sector is
(3) p1 = wsa1s + wua1u,
where p1 is expressed in domestic currency. The aggregate import competing sector behaves
differently. First, the sector can be protected by tariffs, denoted by t. This is best interpreted
as the average national tariff across several import sectors. Second, in sector 2 there is a
union that represents unskilled labor. To model the role of unions, but at the same time to
depart as little as possible from the standard model, we adopt a simple rule for the behavior
of unions and the wage setting mechanism.9 This rule works as follows. In the absence
of a tariff in sector 2, free entry and zero profits imply that p∗2 = wsa2s + wua2u. With a
tariff t, firms face a price p2 = p
∗
2(1 + t) and, keeping factor prices constant, would enjoy
instantaneous profits equal to p∗2t. We call this the “tariff rent.”
Unions negotiate with incumbent firms and successfully appropriate a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of
these rents.10 This income is then transferred to unskilled workers in sector 2 via a premium
9An explicit model of the bargaining mechanism of firms and unions requires profits in equilibrium. This,
in turn, would require either adding one (fixed) factor to collect those profits or departing from competition
(as in a model with monopolistic competition). For example, Gaston and Trefler (1995) build a model where
unions bargain wages above market clearing conditions in order to share rents generated in non-competitive
product markets. While we could have followed a similar approach here, we opted for the model presented
here to prioritize simplicity. All our qualitative results hold in these more complicated models as well.
10In Argentina, unions negotiate with different Manufacturing Chambers that essentially represent
incumbent producers.
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over the competitive wage in both the non-tradable and export sectors wu. Formally,
(4) w2u = wu + α
p∗2t
a2u
.
The second term on the right hand side of (4) is thus the tariff rent appropriated by the union
per unit of unskilled labor. For simplicity, we assume that a2u is given at its equilibrium
level when unions compute the tariff rent.
Once unions secure this fraction of the “tariff rent,” competitive forces begin to work
as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model. This means that the extra-profits generated by
the tariffs (the part not appropriated by the unions) will attract entrants into the import
competing sector, which will expand and thus demand more skilled and unskilled labor (the
export sector will instead contract and release those factors). In the end, competitive wages
ws and wu will adjust until those profits dissipate completely. In equilibrium, thus, this free
entry condition translates into an ex-post zero-profit condition in sector 2
(5) p2 = wSa2s + w2ua2u.
This is a simple 2 × 2 model of trade with a non-tradable sector. Given the prices of the
tradable goods, the system determines the competitive wages for skilled and unskilled labor
ws and wu. The zero profit condition in the non-traded sector determines p0. Lastly, the
wage-setting rule determines the unskilled wage in the import competing sectors.
To investigate how the structure of wages depends on the structure of protection, totally
differentiate (3), (4) and (5) to get
(6) θ1sŵs + θ1uŵu = 0,
(7) −(wu/w2u)ŵu + ŵ2u = (α/θ2u)τ t̂,
(8) θ2sŵs + θ2uŵ2u = τ t̂,
where τ = t
1+t
, x̂ = dx/x, and θis = (aisws)/pi, i = 1, 2; θ1u = a1uwu/p1; and θ2u =
15
a2uw2u/p2. Our skilled intensity assumption of sector 2 implies that B = θ1sθ2u
wu
w2u
−θ1uθ2s <
0. The solution for the changes in wages is thus
(9)
ŵs
t̂
= − 1
B
τθ1u(1− α) > 0,
(10)
ŵu
t̂
=
1
B
τθ1s(1− α) < 0,
(11)
ŵ2u
t̂
=
1
B
τθ1s
wu
w2u
(1− αa1u
a1s
a2s
a2u
) ≷ 0.
Note that, provided t̂ > 0, ŵ2u > ŵu (ŵ2u < ŵu otherwise).
Several key results, depicted in Figure 5, emerge from our simple model. Since
factor abundance plays a role in determining the pattern of trade, the model delivers a
Stolper-Samuelson prediction. An increase in the (average) tariff causes sector 2 to expand
and demand factors of production and this in turn affects factor prices. Since sector 2 is
intensive in skilled labor, an increase in t generates an increase in the skilled wage (equation
9) and a reduction in the competitive unskilled wage (equation 10). In consequence, increases
in tariffs cause the skill premium to increase so that trade liberalization should lead to a
decline in wage inequality.
In Figure 5, the initial equilibrium is at a. An increase in t shifts the curve defined by
p∗2[1+t(1−α)] = wsa2s+wua2u up. As a result, ws increases and wu declines. Notice that the
increase in the tariff t causes the unskilled wage in sector 2 to increase above the equilibrium
wu. In the end, w2u could increase or decrease, depending on the response of the competitive
wage and on the power of unions to extract tariff rents. If unions can appropriate all the
instantaneous tariff rents (α = 1), then neither ws or wu would change and w2u would instead
increase by the full magnitude of the tariff rent.
A number of additional results follow from comparing the structure of wages brought
about by the unions. The model predicts that sectors protected by tariffs pay higher wages.
To see this, notice that unskilled wages in the protected sector are actually higher than in
the non-tradable and export sectors. This is consistent with the “trade premium” in Figure
2. Further, the wedge between w2u and wu is increasing in the average tariff t. This means
16
Figure 5
Tariffs, Unions and Wages
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Note: Equilibrium wages for skilled and unskilled workers in the presence of unions. Not
drawn to scale.
that these “trade premiums” should themselves depend on sectoral tariffs, as suggested by
Figures 1 and 2.
For simplicity, we have worked so far with a 2×2 model. With more sectors and/or factors,
the strong predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem do not hold: only statements about
correlations between factor intensities, product price changes and factor price changes can
be established. However, it is worth making further abstractions in the model to derive some
predictions regarding the structure of protection and wages across import sectors. Clearly,
the model suggests that, within the import sector, those more heavily protected are likely
to pay even higher unskilled wages. A corollary of this result is that since all sectors pay the
same wages for skilled labor, the model predicts the existence of different skill premiums at
the industry level. Moreover, this skill premium depends on the sectoral tariff t (and on the
sectoral power of unions as well).
This can be more formally seen as follows. Assume there are two import competing
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sectors, x and y. Both sectors are protected by tariffs tx and ty (so that the average tariff
is t = φxtx + φyty given weights φx and φy). Both sectors are protected by unions, and the
wage setting rules are11
(12) wju = wu + αj
p∗j tj
aju
,
for j = x, y. To inspect the implications of the model, we can, for example, change the
structure of tariffs tx and ty while keeping the average tariff t constant. In principle, this
should not affect competitive wages in the export (and non-tradable) sector. However, the
structure of unskilled wages within the import sector does change. Differentiating (12) with
respect to tx and ty, while holding t constant (so that φxdtx + φydty = 0), we get
(13) ŵxu = (αx/θxu)τxt̂x,
and
(14) ŵyu = −(αy/θyu)τy(φx/φy)t̂x.
An increase in the protection granted to sector x causes the unskilled wage in sector x to
increase and the skilled premium in that sector to decline. In addition, while the tariff in
sector y drops, the unskilled wage declines and the skilled premium instead increases. In
consequence, the model predicts an inverse relationship between the sector tariff and the
industry skill premium. This is consistent with the correlations revealed in Figure 4.
A model with imperfect labor mobility is the leading competing hypothesis to our model
with unions. While unions have been prevalent in Argentine history, there is also evidence
that labor is not fully mobile as in many other developing countries. There are some peculiar
issues with factor specificity, though. The simplest possible model would allow for imperfect
mobility of unskilled labor (and perfect mobility of skilled labor). In this context, it is easy
to see how sectoral tariffs would raise unskilled wages in protected sectors so that, together
11The average unskilled wage in the import sector would be w2u as defined above.
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with equalized inter-sectoral skilled wages, this model would work exactly as our union
model. If, instead, unskilled labor is perfectly mobile but skilled labor is not, then factor
specificity is not enough to deliver predictions that are consistent with the trends observed
in our data. Some sort of non-competitive wage setting would be required. Unions can play
such a role in a hybrid model of trade, unions, and factor specificity. Finally, another option
is to allow both skilled and unskilled labor to be imperfectly mobile. To accommodate the
Heckscher-Ohlin trends, however, such a model should contain dynamic features whereby
factor specificity is gradually lost, as in Mussa (1978). In any case, our choice of developing
a model with unions rather than with factor specificity is guided by both plausibility and
simplicity. As argued, our aim is to have a framework to understand the trends of section 2
and the regression results that we discuss next.12
4 The Impacts of Tariffs on wages
In this section, we investigate econometrically the main features of our data revealed by the
snapshots of the previous section. These snapshots first show that, ceteris paribus, sectors
protected by tariffs should pay higher wages. In addition, in the Argentine data, there
seems to be a skill premium at the industry level that is partly explained by the level of
tariff protection. This suggests the existence of (short-run) departures from the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model and, in our theoretical framework, this role is played by sectoral
unions. In consequence, any attempt to infer Stolper-Samuelson effects with only a few
cross-sections of industry wages will be clouded by those same departures from the standard
model. Instead, it would be possible to identify those effects once the sectoral structure of
protection is accounted for. That is, conditional on the structure of tariffs at the industry
level, we should find that the average national tariff affects relative wages according to the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade.13
12Naturally, there could also be other forces at work. For instance, Atolia (2007) develops a dynamic
model with complementarities between capital and skills that also suggests short-term departures from
Stolper-Samuelson results and long-term Stolper-Samuelson trends. Bustos (2005) provides empirical results
for Argentina consistent with this view.
13Notice that, although we are able to test the predictions that are consistent with our model, given the
available data, we are unable to fully investigate the mechanisms indicated in section 3—for instance, unions
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4.1 Trade Protection: Tariffs and Industry Wages
In our model, protected sectors pay higher wages. In section 2, we motivated this prediction
by showing that the tradable premium (the coefficient of a dummy for tradable industries in
a standard earnings equation) was positive. To further investigate this prediction, we begin
with a simple econometric model in which sectoral tariffs affect industry wages (without
distinguishing between skilled and unskilled industry premiums at this moment).
We regress the log of the wage of individual i, in industry j, at time t, (lnwijt), on the log
of the tariff in industry j at time t, ln τjt, an indicator of skill level dSigjt (where d stands for
dummy indicators and g indicates whether the worker is skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled),
and a number of other individual characteristics (xijt) including age, gender, and marital
status. Thus, the model that we estimate is
(15) lnwijt = x
′
ijtβt +
∑
g
δgtdSigjt + α ln τjt + Ij + Yt + µijt,
where Ij is an industry fixed effect, Yt is a survey-period fixed effect, and µijt is the error
term. As explained in section 2, we use data on sectoral tariffs at the 3-digit level.
We report findings from four different econometric models. In Model 1, the returns to
schooling (δg) and tenure are constant across time; in Model 2, the returns to schooling are
allowed to vary from survey to survey (δgt), but the returns to age are not time-varying;
in Model 3, both the returns to schooling and the returns to age vary across surveys. In
Model (4), we further allow for a sectoral linear trend in the model to control for possible
trends in the change in wages that might be a confounding factor for the impact of tariffs.
A nice feature of our study is that the two episodes of trade liberalization that we exploit to
identify the effect of tariffs on wages are separated in time by approximately a whole decade.
This gives us enough variability to disentangle, by exploiting the within sector variability
in tariffs, the effect of trade liberalization on wages from other concurrent secular trends in
wages at the industry level.
In all our specifications, we include period-fixed effects and industry dummies. This
or factor immobility, or both.
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controls for changes in exchange rates (devaluations and appreciations) and industry-specific
characteristics so that the impacts of tariffs are not confounded by industry characteristics or
by aggregate shocks (related to policy or business cycle). These fixed effects also account for
unobservable variables that could induce a spurious correlation between tariffs and wages.
Since our tariff measures vary across industries, any clustering in the residuals µijt in
(15) may be exacerbated (Moulton, 1990). In all our regressions, thus, inference is made
on the basis of a robust, cluster-corrected estimation of the variance of the error term. In
all our results, we report two estimates of the standard errors. In one model, we allow for
clustering at the industry level to account for autocorrelation in the residuals at the industry
level (that is, for shocks to the industry that may perpetuate in time). In the second model,
the errors are clustered at the time-industry level.14 Our results are robust to these two
models of cluster effects.
The main results from model (15) are reported in Table 1. Columns (1) to (4) correspond
to Models 1 to 4, respectively; the standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported
within parenthesis while those clustered by industry and time are reported within brackets.
We find a positive effect of tariffs on wages, a relationship that is significant at the 10 percent
level of statistical significance. These results are not affected by allowing the returns to
schooling to vary from period to period (time-varying returns to schooling in column 2) and
by allowing both the returns to schooling and age to be time-varying (column 3). Further,
the results remain practically unaltered if we also include sector-specific linear trends in the
model (columns 4).
Our findings support the view that, ceteris paribus, trade barriers protect workers
earnings across the board.15 Although these findings are more or less expected, the previous
literature is sometimes inconclusive. In Argentina, for instance, Galiani and Sanguinetti
(2003) do not find a positive association between tariffs and wages (though they do find a
significant association with import penetration measures). Currie and Harrison (1997) and
Harrison and Hanson (1999) are other examples where tariffs show up insignificant in wage
14This is the standard clustering analyzed in Moulton (1990).
15Since the model condition on parametric and non-parametric time trends, the correct interpretation of
the negative effect of trade liberalization on wages is conditional on any growth effect of that trade reform.
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equations. In Attanasio, Goldberg, and Pavcnik (2004), on the other hand, tariffs have a
significant impact on the industry premiums and overall wages, and in Revenga (1997), real
wages are also found to be affected by tariffs.16
4.2 Tariff Reforms and the Industry Skill Premium
In this section we test whether sectoral tariffs also affect the skill premium at the industry
level. This claim is a corollary of the analytical framework of section 3, where the industry
skill premium can arise in equilibrium in the presence of unions (but could arise more
generally with imperfect labor mobility across sectors). We want to investigate if these
industry skill premiums are, in part, due to the structure of tariff protection across sectors.
Our benchmark regression is:
(16) lnwijt = x
′
ijtβt +
∑
g
δgtdSigjt + α ln τjt +
∑
g
φgdSigjt ln τjt + Ij + Yt + µijt,
This model differs from model (15) in that we add interaction terms between the trade
policy variable (the log of tariffs, ln τ) and the educational attainment dummies (dSigjt).
The coefficients of these interactions, φg, can be interpreted as the differential impact of
trade on the wage of individuals with different education, over and above the average effect
of trade protection.17
Our main findings are reported in Table 2. We estimate the four models described in the
previous section (with the standard errors clustered by industry—within parenthesis—and
by industry-time—within brackets). In the first row of the table, we show the direct impact
of tariffs on average wages. We find evidence of a positive and significant effect of tariffs
on the wages of unskilled labor (at the 10 percent level). The magnitudes of the coefficient
range from 0.355 to 0.447.
16The literature on this topic is very rich. Our review of the evidence is necessarily short, to avoid
distracting attention from the main results of our paper. A recent survey on the trade-wages link is Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2007).
17We also experimented with interactions of tariffs and age to explore the links between trade protection
and tenure. We did not find any statistically significant association between trade policy and returns to age.
See below.
22
The second and third rows report the coefficients of the impact of the sectoral tariffs
on the skilled wage premium. Interestingly, we find no evidence of any impact of trade
protection on skilled wage premiums in a model that imposes common returns to schooling
and tenure across time periods (column 1). In principle, however, we should expect the skill
premium to be affected across time by many factors other than trade policy (such as skill
biased technical change or changes in labor regulations). In column (2), thus, we allow the
returns to schooling to vary from period to period. In column (3), we further allow the
returns to tenure to vary from period to period. In all these models, we find that trade
protection affects negatively and significantly the returns to higher education. These results
are robust (and remain practically unchanged) to the inclusion of sector specific linear trends
(see column (4)).
Our findings confirm the intuition uncovered by Figures 3 and 4: after controlling for
key confounding factors, reductions in average tariffs lead to increases in the skilled wage
premium and to increases in wage inequality. These results appear to be very robust. They
are not an artifact of the business cycle or spurious trends since we control for period effects.
We claim that our results are neither driven by confounding the effect of tariffs on the skill
premiums with unobservable industry fixed characteristics (as industry dummies are included
in the regression), not are our findings due to industry specific trends. They are not the
result of concurrent confounding policy factors, like labor reforms or industrial policies,
since individual characteristics and time varying returns to age and education help control
for them. Overall, thus, the results do not seem to be driven by unobservables.
We turn now to a sensitivity analysis. In Table 3, we reproduce the analysis of Table 2
but with a new definition of skills. Here, we classified as skill labor all workers with either a
college degree or a complete secondary school degree. This alternative definition of skill could
be important especially during the 1970s, when college eduction was much less widespread
than it is today. Unskilled workers comprise all individuals with incomplete secondary or
lower education. Our findings are robust to this new definition of skills. Tariffs have a direct
positive impact on unskilled wages (significant only at the 10 percent level) and a negative
impact on the skill premium (significant at the 1 percent level).
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There are three further concerns about the results in Table 2 that we need to address.
One concern is that the association of tariffs with the skill premium in the historical data
may be driven by the sharp drop in tariffs during the 1970s. Indeed, as pointed out before,
the tariff cuts of the 1970s are approximately 5 times larger than the cuts of the liberalization
of the 1990s. To rule out this possibility, we experimented by breaking down the historical
series and dropping the 1970s from the analysis.
Our main results are reported in Table 4. The first column reproduces column (3) of Table
2—i.e., the model for 1974-2001 with three educational categories and time-varying returns to
schooling and age. In column (2), we exclude the 1970s from the analysis. Our main findings
are unaffected by this change in the sample period. Tariffs are shown to have positive effects
on average wages and negative and more significant effects on the skill premium. In fact,
the impacts on the skill premium are even larger when the 1970s are excluded, strongly
suggesting that our results are not driven by the tariffs cuts of this period. In column (3),
we exclude all years in the 1974-1982 period, where the tariff cuts were the largest (Figure
3). Once again, our findings are robust to the exclusion of these years.
The second concern is the role of non-tariff barriers like quotas or quantitative restrictions.
These are usual instruments of the Argentine trade policy, and provided non-tariff barriers
are correlated with tariff barriers, their omission in the regressions can cast doubts on the
interpretation of our key results. The problem with non-tariff barriers is that we were
unable to construct historical series spanning the period under study. Even simple measures
of coverage ratios are unavailable (or very hard to construct).18
In principle, if non-tariff barriers were uncorrelated with tariffs, our estimates would
be consistent. However, this correlation might be present, for instance if quotas are high in
those industries with low tariffs. Nevertheless, using data on tariffs and non-tariff ad-valorem
equivalents compiled by Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2006), we find that the correlation
between tariffs and non-tariff barriers in Argentina is positive but very small (around 0.03).
This suggests that the omission of non-tariff barriers in the main regressions would not be
18The historical trade data that we put together in this paper does not come electronically. Instead, we had
to collect hard copies of trade data for thousands of HS items for many years and to input them manually.
Non-tariff barriers are usually implemented through legislative decrees specific to the different industries.
Building a historical dataset of norms legislated by decrees is practically unfeasible.
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problematic.
We follow two further strategies to account for the role played by non-tariff barriers.
One way around the problem of lack of data on NTBs is to exploit the sequencing of trade
reforms experienced by Argentina. Berlinski (1994; 2003) has documented that non-tariff
barriers were exclusively used during the debt crisis of 1982-1989. Before that, non-tariff
barriers were not generally used; after that, they were eliminated prior to the tariff cuts of
the liberalization of the 1990s. This suggests a way to check the robustness of our results by
further breaking down the historical series. In column (4) of Table 4, for instance, we exclude
the 1982-1989 period from the analysis. We find that the impacts of tariffs on average wages
are positive, similar in magnitude, but not statistically significant; in contrast, the impacts
of tariffs on the skill premium remain negative and statistically significant.
Non-tariff barriers were fully eliminated from 1988 to 1991. Indeed, the elimination
of quantitative restrictions was a pre-requisite to the negotiations of the common external
tariff of Mercosur (Berlinski, 1994; 2003). Thus, an additional robustness check of the link
between tariffs and the skill premium is to run the model on the 1992-2001 sample. Active
trade policy during this period comprises only tariff changes. Results in column (5) confirm
our previous findings. Tariffs have a positive impact on average wages; this effect is highly
significant during the 1990s. Further, tariffs impact negatively, and highly significantly, on
the skill premium.
A final concern with the analysis is the potential endogeneity of sectoral tariffs to wages
(as in a model of political economy). In our setting, the case for the endogeneity of tariffs is
relatively weak because our regressions include a number of control variables that ameliorate
this problem, namely time-varying returns to schooling and tenure, individual characteristics,
industry effect, time effects, and sectoral trends. The temporal variation in our data is critical
to support this claim. For instance, the endogeneity of tariffs caused by political economy
arguments is unavoidable in cross-section studies but can be controlled for, to a large extent,
with the inclusion in the model of industry dummies, time dummies, and sectoral trends in
the pooled historical data. Once we control for all these variables, the level of protection
is mostly determined by two factors: the worldwide trend towards trade liberalization and
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the initial level of protection (so that sectors with higher tariffs would face larger tariff cuts,
on average).19 We argue that these two factors can reasonably be thought of as exogenous
in our estimated equations. Indeed, the two processes of trade liberalization in Argentina
are entrenched in waves of integration of Latin America to the world. During the 1970s,
all the military governments of the Southern cone in Latin America embarked in similar
programs of trade and financial liberalization. These programs were the first attempt to
undo a large set of regulations enacted during the period of import substitution. The second
wave of trade liberalization started in 1989 is edged within an even broader movement of the
whole continent towards world trade integration following the Washington Consensus and
the GATT agreements.
Furthermore, we claim that pursuing an instrumental variable approach would be
necessarily weak given the impossibility of finding reasonable instruments due to the nature
of our empirical exercise (which spans thirty years of Argentine recent history). Instead, we
exploit here the comparison of the breaks in the trends in tariff reforms and the breaks in the
trends in wage inequality (which are arguably exogenous). We believe that our strategy of
matching sectoral tariffs to sectoral wages through two episodes of trade liberalization and
one episode of reversal to protection provides a valid identification strategy of the effects of
trade liberalization on wages and wage inequality.
4.3 Stolper-Samuelson: The Average Tariff and the Skill Premium
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem of the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that developing
countries should experience an increase in the relative wage of unskilled labor after episodes
of trade liberalization. However, the majority of the literature has identified increases in
wage inequality and in the skill premium following trade reforms. This evidence has been
traditionally reconciled with the theoretical model by noticing that the impacts on wages
depend on the observed tariff changes which, in turn, depend on the initial level of protection.
However, if this last argument is true, we claim that it should be possible to extract
Stolper-Samuelson effects from the data, namely a positive association between the national
19See also Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005)
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average tariff and the skill premium in developing countries (which are abundant in unskilled
labor), once the effects of industry tariffs are accounted for. Concretely, our claim is
that trade liberalization should favor unskilled labor in unskilled labor abundant countries,
conditional on the structure of sectoral protection.
To do this, we set up an empirical model that combines these two impacts of trade:
one stemming from the average national tariff and another stemming from the structure of
sectoral tariffs. The model is estimated in two stages, as in Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005).
In the first stage, we estimate the earnings model in equation (16). From this regression, we
collect the estimates of δt, the economy-wide baseline skill premium. In the second stage,
we exploit the time series dimension of our data and regress the estimated skilled premium,
δt, on the log of the national average tariff τt:
(17) δt = a+ γ ln τt + Ltρ+ νt,
where Lt is the share of skilled to unskilled workers at time t, a control for changes in
the composition of labor supply in Argentina. We estimate equation (17) by the method
of weighted least squares, using the inverse of the estimates of the variance of the skilled
premium from the first stage as weights. In principle, our model could be estimated in
one stage. Our two-stage estimation is an attempt to highlight the need to account for the
cross-sectional structure of protection in order to identify Stolper-Samuelson effects.20
Our results are in Table 5.21 Each entry corresponds to an estimate of the parameter γ
in equation (17), the coefficient of the average national tariff in the second stage regression.
For robustness and consistency with our previous specifications, we estimate three models in
the first stage: these are models 2 to 4 from Tables 2-4. In addition, we estimate two models
for the second stage regression. The first row in Table 5 corresponds to a model of the skill
premium on the average tariff only (without including Lt); in the second row, the model also
includes the composition of skilled to unskilled labor supply between the regressors. We use
20Notice that the omission of the aggregate tariff in the first stage does not generate biases because the
impacts of the national tariff is embedded in the overall skill premium, which varies by year in our models,
or in the survey-period fixed effects.
21The first stage is the same as in Table 2.
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the industry-clustered standard errors as weights.
Our estimates reveal that the average tariff has indeed a positive effect on the
economy-wide, or baseline, skill premium, so that a reduction in tariffs causes this skill
premium to decline. The estimates range from 0.127 to 0.187 so that a 10 percentage points
increase in the average tariff would increase the baseline skilled premium by between 0.0127
to 0.0187 percentage points. This result is consistent with the simple predictions of the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem for a developing country: if Argentina is abundant in unskilled
labor, then trade liberalization should cause unskilled wages to increase and thus the skill
premium to decline.22
These results confirm our claim: conditional on the structure of sectoral tariffs,
our evidence using historical data for Argentina provides some support to the standard
Stolper-Samuelson prediction regarding trade liberalization and wages in Latin America. In
other words, we find that, on the one hand, a particular sectoral tariff benefits the unskilled
labor utilized in that industry; on the other, we find that trade liberalization, meaning
reductions in the average level of tariff protection, benefits the abundant factor, which, in
developing countries, is unskilled labor. In the end, we are able to reconcile the predictions of
the standard factor abundance model of trade, amended to incorporate short-run departures
like unions, with the empirical evidence for most of Latin America.23
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined the links between trade liberalization and skill premiums by
exploring a historical dataset of Argentine trade policy and labor force surveys for the
22Compared to major trade partners like the U.S. or the E.U., Argentina is abundant in unskilled labor
(Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003). On the other hand, Argentina is well-endowed in skills relative to other
countries in Latin America and in the rest of the developing world. However, Berlinski (1994) has shown a
specialization in natural resources and unskilled labor when Argentina is compared with Brazil, the major
partner within the region. All this is evidence that Argentina, for practical purposes, can be considered to
be, if anything, relatively endowed in unskilled labor rather than in skill labor.
23Notice that, given our estimation strategy and the theoretical framework, it is not possible to use our
estimates to forecast the trade-induced changes in the relative wages of unskilled workers. The estimates
from Table 2 are conditional on the average tariff, and the estimates from Table 5 are conditional on the
cross-sectional structure of protection. Our results illustrate how to estimate Stolper-Samuelson effects,
rather than to provide structural estimates of the relationship between tariffs and wages.
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period 1974-2001. The period under study is one of active and fluctuating trade reforms
and wage inequality in Argentina. Tariff reforms accelerated in the late 1970s and early
1980s, stagnated during the 1980s, and picked up further momentum during the 1990s.
The skill premium, in contrast, increased during the 1970s, declined during the 1980s, and
increased again during the 1990s.
We have produced three pieces of econometric evidence. First, we have found that, ceteris
paribus, trade liberalization reduce the average wage of workers in protected industries.
Second, we have documented that, in Argentina, there is a skill premium at the industry
level. Furthermore, this skill premium is, in part, affected by tariff protection. Finally,
we have established that, conditional on the structure of tariffs at the industry level, the
average tariff in the economy is positively associated with the average skill premium. This
is an important contribution of our work. This finding imply that, once the structure of
sectoral protection is controlled for, trade liberalization should decrease wage inequality in
Argentina. This result provides a reconciliation of the Stolper-Samuelson predictions with
the observed trends in wage inequality in Latin America.
Our core results suggest that a useful modern model of trade reform and wage inequality
should combine traditional explanations of the pattern of trade with non-competitive wage
setting mechanisms. To support this claim, we have developed a simple factor abundance
model (as in Heckscher-Ohlin) where unions set wages of unskilled labor in import competing
sectors. While such a model rationalizes our findings, other modeling frameworks with factor
specificity are likely to play a role as well. In addition, Atolia (2007) develops an alternative
model with capital complementarity of skills that would also allow for a reconciliation of HOS
theory. The ultimate lesson is that the Stolper-Samuelson effects predicted for Latin America
are found to play a role in shaping the wage distribution, but only after the incorporation
of some mechanism for inter-industry wage differences.
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Table 1
The Impacts of Tariffs on log Wages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log tariff 0.357∗ 0.353∗ 0.355∗ 0.412∗
(0.203) (0.206) (0.205) (0.226)
[0.215] [0.216] [0.216] [0.247]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to age
No No Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets
(clustered by industry and time period). The regression includes three educational
categories. Skilled labor includes college graduates, semiskilled labor includes
workers with secondary school and incomplete college; unskilled labor includes
incomplete secondary or less. *: Significant at 10Other controls: age, age
squared, gender dummy, head dummy, marital status, and the three (un-interacted)
educational dummies).
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Table 2
Tariff Reform and the Industry Skill Premium
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Tariff 0.355∗ 0.388∗ 0.389∗ 0.447∗
(0.200) (0.211) (0.210) (0.231)
[0.213] [0.224] [0.224] [0.254]
log Tariff*SemiSkilled 0.033 −0.077 −0.076 -0.082
(0.031) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058)
[0.033] [0.053] [0.054] [0.054]
log Tariff*Skilled −0.098 −0.355∗∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.124) (0.123) (0.121)
[0.068] [0.133] [0.131] [0.127]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to age
No No Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets (clustered
by industry and time period). The regression includes three educational categories. Skilled
labor includes college graduates, semiskilled labor includes workers with secondary school
and incomplete college; unskilled labor includes incomplete secondary or less. *: Significant
at 10% **: Significant at 5% ***: Significant at 1% Other controls: age, age squared, gender
dummy, head dummy, marital status, and the three (un-interacted) educational dummies).
35
Table 3
Tariff Reform and the Industry Skill Premium
Sensitivity to The Definition of Skilled Labor
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Tariff 0.359∗ 0.401∗ 0.402∗ 0.455∗
(0.199) (0.208) (0.207) (0.229)
[0.212] [0.223] [0.222] [0.253]
log Tariff*Skilled −0.002 −0.158∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066)
[0.035] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
No Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to age
No No Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral Trends No No No Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 29053 29053 29053 29053
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets
(clustered by industry and time period). The regression includes two educational
categories. Skilled labor includes college and secondary school graduates, and unskilled
labor includes workers with less than complete secondary school. *: Significant at
10% **: Significant at 5% ***: Significant at 1% Other controls: age, age squared,
gender dummy, head dummy, marital status, and the three (un-interacted) educational
dummies).
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Table 4
Robustness Check
1974-19811974-2001 1978-2001 1982-2001
1990-2001
1992-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log tariff 0.389∗ 0.456∗ 0.595∗ 0.335 0.128∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.248) (0.324) (0.260) (0.054)
[0.224] [0.267] [0.317] [0.257] [0.043]
log tariff*semiskilled −0.076 −0.088 −0.134 −0.127∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.072) (0.094) (0.078) (0.071)
[0.054] [0.072] [0.083] [0.056] [0.049]
log tariff*skilled −0.339∗∗∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.148) (0.183) (0.142) (0.165)
[0.131] [0.158] [0.182] [0.142] [0.111]
Time-varying
returns to schooling
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying
returns to age
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.35
Observations 29053 24072 21783 21126 11131
Notes. Standard errors: in parentheses (clustered by 3-digit industry); in brackets (clustered by industry
and time period). The regression includes two educational categories. Skilled labor includes college and
secondary school graduates, and unskilled labor includes workers with less than complete secondary school.
*: Significant at 10% **: Significant at 5% ***: Significant at 1% Other controls: age, age squared, gender
dummy, head dummy, marital status.
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Table 5
The Average Tariff and the Skill Premium
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(1) (2) (3)
Average national tariff 0.139∗ 0.128∗ 0.127∗
(0.076) (0.075) (0.070)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19
Average national tariff 0.182∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.187∗∗
(with supply composition) (0.082) (0.081) (0.076)
R2 0.21 0.19 0.19
Observations 39 39 39
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The results correspond to the
coefficient of the average national tariff on the average skill premium from
a two-stages regression model. In the first stage, we run the model in equation
(16) and recover the skill premium. In the second stage, we regress the skill
premium on the average national tariff (using the time series dimension of the
data only). We estimate three models in the first stage, Models 2 to 4 in Table
2. The first row in the table corresponds to a model of the skill premium on the
average tariff only. In the second row, the model also includes the composition
of skill to unskill labor supply. *: Significant at 10% **: Significant at 5%
***: Significant at 1%
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